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Abstract. Truths require truthmakers, many think. In this paper I will discuss the 
scope of this requirement. Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that, necessarily, 
all truths require truthmakers. I shall argue against this claim. I shall argue 
against it on the basis of its implications. I shall first consider its implications 
when applied to synthetic, contingent propositions. If the truthmaker requirement 
applies to these propositions, so I shall argue, it is not possible for there to be 
nothing, and it is not possible for any (possibly) accompanied entity to exist on its 
own. I shall then consider its implications when applied to modal propositions, 
specifically those concerning possible existence. I shall argue that if the truthmaker 
requirement applies to such propositions, then there can be no relation which is 
equivalent to metaphysical explanation, which – I shall suggest – amounts to a 
denial of the existence of grounding. 
 
 
0. Introduction 
 
 
Truthmaker theories encapsulate the notion that truths require 
truthmakers. They consist of two parts. The first part concerns the 
scope of this truthmaker requirement: which truths require 
truthmakers. The second part concerns the characterization of a 
truthmaker: what a truthmaker is. I shall consider a truthmaker 
theory (TT) which consists of three necessitated claims. The first 
claim is truthmaker maximalism (TM): the thesis that, necessarily, 
all truths require truthmakers. This is the claim concerning scope. 
The second claim is truthmaker necessitarianism (TN): the thesis 
that, necessarily, a truthmaker is an entity which strictly implies 
the proposition it makes true. The third claim is truthmaker 
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explanatorialism (TE): the thesis that, necessarily, a truthmaker is 
an entity which explains the truth of the proposition it makes true. 
These are the claims concerning characterization. 
I shall argue that truthmaker maximalism (TM) needs to be 
restricted. I shall first consider its implications when applied to all 
contingent, synthetic propositions. I shall show that TM entails that it 
is not possible for there to be nothing (Section 2) and that, given TN, 
it is not possible for any possibly accompanied entity to exist alone 
(Section 3). I shall then explicate truthmaker explanatorialism 
(Section 4) and consider its implications regarding modal truths, 
namely those concerning what could possibly exist. I shall argue 
that when applied to these truths TM, given TE and TN, make a 
picture of grounding as equivalent to metaphysical explanation 
untenable, which I shall suggest amounts to a denial of the 
existence of a grounding relation (Section 5). 
 
 
1. Truthmaker Maximalism 
 
Truthmaker maximalism is the theory that, necessarily, every true 
proposition has a truthmaker. I.e.: 
 
TM: □∀P (P → ∃x xTMP) 
 
Where ‘TM’ is a binary relation which translates as ‘...makes 
true…’, and ‘P’ ranges over propositions. There are many truthmaker 
maximalists.1 There are also people who are almost-maximalists. 
Rodriguez-Pereya is the prime example, who restricts the truthmaker 
requirement to (a large class of) synthetic propositions.2 And there 
are several who think that, if one isn’t a maximalist, one ought to be.3 
                                                 
1  E.g. Molnar, G., (2000), Lowe, E.J., (2006), Cameron, R., (2008), Schaffer, J., 
(2010) and, of course, Armstrong, D., (e.g. 2004). 
2  Rodriguez-Pereya, G., (2005). 
3  Merricks, T., (2007), Cameron, R., (ibid), Jago, M., (2012).  
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Truthmaker maximalists need an account of what a 
truthmaker is. All the aforementioned agree with the following 
necessary condition: x makes true P only if x’s existence strictly 
implies P. This is called truthmaker necessitarianism (TN): 
 
TN: □ ∀x∀P (xTMP → □ (∃y x=y → P) 
 
This agreement is unsurprising, for almost everyone writing 
on truthmakers believes TN.4 However, few (nowadays) believe 
strict implication is a sufficient condition for x to be a truthmaker 
for P. The problems with taking it as a sufficient condition are well 
known and I won’t reiterate them here.5 So further conditions will 
be needed. However, TM and TN are quite enough to make 
trouble, as we will soon see. 
 
 
2. Empty Worlds 
 
TM alone implies there can be no empty worlds. e is an empty world 
if and only if e contains no entities. Suppose – for reduction – e is a 
possible world. If e is a possible world, the proposition <There are 
no entities> is true of e. Call this proposition EMPTY.6 This is a 
contingent, synthetic, proposition. TM implies that, if EMPTY is 
true, there is some entity in e which makes EMPTY true. But by 
hypothesis there are no entities in e. Contradiction. Therefore, e is 
not a possible world. TM implies that no possible world is an 
empty world: that it is not possible for there to be nothing.7 
 
                                                 
4  An exception being Parsons, J., (1999). 
5  See Restall, J., (1996). 
6  Note EMPTY is true of e, not in e. So it is not required, per impossible, that 
an empty world contains a proposition. 
7  Armstrong tentatively rejects this conclusion in his (2004), despite endorsing 
it in his (1989). His arguments are adequately treated in Efird, D., and 
Stoneham, T. (2009). They also explain why relaxing the necessity of the 
claims that constitute truthmaker theory is unpalatable. 
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Conclusion 1:  
 
TM → □∀x (x=x) 
 
This conclusion will not worry someone who believes in the 
existence of necessary beings, for if some entities exist necessarily, 
then there cannot be an empty world. However, a parallel 
conclusion arises in this context: Suppose we replace <There are 
no entities> with <There are no entities which exist contingently>. 
Call this latter proposition EMPTYc. Suppose – for reduction – e is 
a possible world which contains no contingently existing entities. 
Then EMPTYc is true in e. EMPTYc is a contingent truth, for it is 
possible for there to be entities which exist contingently. However, 
by TM, EMPTYc needs a truthmaker. Given there are no 
contingent entities in e, that truthmaker must be a necessarily 
existing entity. By TN that truthmaker strictly implies EMPTYc. 
Therefore, EMPTYc is not a contingent truth. Contradiction. 
Hence, TM + TN entail that there is no possible world empty of 
contingent entities.8 But there are such worlds so, given TN, TM is 
false. The truthmaker requirement cannot apply to to all the 
contingent, presumably synthetic propositions concerning how 
many entities exist. 
 
 
3. Lonely Worlds 
 
Let us consider a world, v, which differs from e in just one respect: 
v contains a single entity, u. Call v a lonely world. A world is a 
lonely world if and only if it contains just one entity. Now TM 
generates a problem in conjunction with TN. TM entails (given 
TN) that u is necessarily alone (poor u). This is because the 
proposition <u is the only entity> is true of v. Call this proposition 
                                                 
8  I shall ignore the complication of necessary existents in the succeeding 
section, for a parallel problem emerges. 
THE SCOPE OF THE TRUTHMAKER REQUIREMENT 27 
LONELY. This is another contingent, synthetic proposition. By 
TM, LONELY has a truthmaker. 
The only available truthmaker is u, therefore u makes 
LONELY true. However, by TN, u makes LONELY true only if u’s 
existence strictly implies LONELY. Therefore, u’s existence strictly 
implies LONELY.  
The remainder of this argument rests on S5, a modal logic in 
which the accessibility relation is symmetric and transitive.9 Given 
S5, suppose – for reduction – that it is possible for u to exist in some 
other world, q, where q contains another entity as well as 
containing u. S5 guarantees that q and v are mutually accessible, if 
either is accessible from the actual world.10 It is not true of q that <u 
is the only entity>. However, u strictly implies <u is the only 
entity>. So, given q is accessible to v, it is true of q that <u is the 
only entity>. Contradiction. Therefore, given v is a possible world, 
there is no possible world, such as q, in which u exists and which 
contains some entity distinct from u. In the modal language, TM 
(given TN) entails that, if it is possible for an entity to exist on its 
own, that entity necessarily exists on its own. 
 
Conclusion 2: 
 
TM ∧ TN → ((∀x ♢(∃y x=y ∧ ¬∃z z≠x)) → □ (∃y x=y → ¬∃z z≠x)) 
 
We can adduce an interesting corollary of Conclusion 2. 
Namely, no entity in the actual world could exist on its own. This 
follows because the actual world has more than one entity in. 
Hence, entities in the actual world do not exist on their own. 
Hence, by the T-schema, no entity in the actual world necessarily 
exists on its own. This, by modus tollens on (the consequent of) 
                                                 
9  Alternatively, ♢P → □♢P. 
10  If q is not accessible from the actual world, Conclusion 2 follows 
straightforwardly, for then q is not possible. If v is not accessible from the 
actual world, then Conclusion 2 follows vacuously, for then it is 
impossible for any entity to exist on its own.  
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Conclusion 2, entails that no entity in the actual world possibly 
exists on its own. 
If q is not accessible from the actual world, Conclusion 2 follows 
straightforwardly, for then q is not possible. If v is not accessible 
from the actual world, then Conclusion 2 follows vacuously, for 
then it is impossible for any entity to exist on its own.  
 
Corollary@:  
 
TM ∧ TN → ∀x (@∃y x=y → ¬♢ (∃y x=y ∧ ¬∃z z≠x)) 
 
This corollary is a special (and particularly interesting) instance 
of a more general result. TM (given TN) implies that no entity 
which can be accompanied can also be alone. This is, to reiterate, 
because if said entity, call it h, can be alone, then that strictly 
implies <h is the only entity in this world>, which will generate a 
contradiction if h is possibly accompanied (given S5). Hence: 
 
CorollaryG: 
 
TM ∧ TN → □∀x (♢ (∃y x=y ∧ ∃z z≠x) → ¬♢ (∃y x=y ∧ ¬∃z z≠x)) 
 
But, of course, entities which are possibly accompanied 
could exist alone. And hence the truthmaker requirement needs to 
be restricted: it cannot apply to all the contingent, presumably 
synthetic truths concerning both which entities exist, and how 
many other entities exist.11 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11  If q is not accessible from the actual world, Conclusion 2 follows 
straightforwardly, for then q is not possible. If v is not accessible from the 
actual world, then Conclusion 2 follows vacuously, for then it is impossible 
for any entity to exist on its own.  
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4. Truthmaker Explanatorialism 
 
Let us take stock. If what I have said is right, TM alone entails that 
there can be no empty worlds and combined with TN it entails 
that any individual which can exist on its own must exist on its 
own; it could not exist accompanied. This second conclusion has as a 
corollary that no actually existing individual could exist alone and no 
individual which can exist accompanied cannot also exist alone. 
This seems bad enough. However, as has been noted, truthmaker 
necessitarianism cannot capture all there is for something to be a 
truthmaker for some proposition. This is because entities which 
strictly entail propositions can all the same be irrelevant to those 
proposition’s truth. My thumb’s existence strictly entails <2+3=5>, 
but my thumb is irrelevant to the truth of <2+3=5>. For this reason, 
it cannot make true <2+3=5>. So truthmakers need to be relevant to 
the truths they make. How to spell out this idea of relevance? By far 
the most plausible, dominant, way is by reference to explanation: the 
relevance truthmakers need is explanatory relevance; truthmakers 
need to explain the truths they make true. In this sense, my thumb 
is not the truthmaker of <3+2=5> because my thumb’s existence is 
not relevant to the truth of <3+2=5>. My thumb is no way 
explanatorily relevant to the truths of mathematics. This leads us 
to truthmaker explanatorialism (TE): the thesis that x is a 
truthmaker for P only if x’s existence explains the truth of P. I.e.: 
 
TE: □ ∀x∀P (xTMP → □ (∃y x=y < P) 
 
Here ‘<’ is a binary operator which translates as ‘...explains 
the truth of…’. The explanation in question is metaphysical 
explanation. x’s existence metaphysically explains the truth of P. 
In some cases, TE is quite explicit.12 In other cases it is obviously 
                                                 
12  If q is not accessible from the actual world, Conclusion 2 follows 
straightforwardly, for then q is not possible. If v is not accessible from the 
actual world, then Conclusion 2 follows vacuously, for then it is impossible 
for any entity to exist on its own.  
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implicit. Trenton Merricks would substitute the language of 
explanation for that of aboutness, but he thinks the two are 
equivalent.13 Schaffer would prefer the language of grounding14 
but this is typically explicated by the notion of (metaphysical) 
explanation.15 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereya would take in virtue of as 
the primitive, but also links this locution with explanation.16 Even 
those, like E.J Lowe, who give an account of truthmaking in terms 
of essence (i.e. x makes true P only if it is essential to P that P is 
true if x exists) can be welcomed into the explanatorialist fold, for 
the concept of essence in play is not a modal one, but a more 
Finean one, in which essence itself is linked with explanation.17 
So TE should be congenial to all these truthmaker theorists. 
It certainly seems the most natural way to extend our 
characterization of truthmakers.18 In the succeeding section we 
will see how explanatorialism generates a further problem for 
truthmaker theory. 
 
 
5. Modal Truths 
 
Let us consider modal truths, in particular those which ascribe the 
possibility of existence. The argument in this section will rest on 
the B-schema. I shall argue that, given the B-schema, truthmaker 
theory (TT) makes untenable a particular picture of grounding; 
the picture of grounding which takes grounding relations to be the 
relations of metaphysical explanation. But grounding is almost 
invariably taken to be such an explanatory relation:19 this 
characterization seems to fix the references of ‘grounds’. As such, I 
                                                 
13  Merricks, T., (2007, pg. 30). 
14  Schaffer, J., (2010a). 
15  Rosen, G., (2010), Audi, P., (2013). 
16  Rodriguez-Pereya, G., (2005, pg. 18 & 27). 
17  Lowe, E.J., (2006). 
18  Or possibly to replace TN. I’ll make no distinction between these options, 
because most would agree that TE entails TN. 
19  e.g. Rosen, G., (2010), Schaffer, J., (2010b), Fine, K., (2012), Audi, P., (2013). 
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will (cautiously) suggest that this ‘making untenable’ amounts to 
denying the existence of grounding relations. 
The relevant picture, as I say, takes grounding relations to 
be the relations of metaphysical explanation. Putative instances of 
grounding include realization, composition, constitution and 
emergence. Under the moniker ‘grounding’ these relations are 
meant to vindicate a ‘layered’ conception of the world, where the 
lower layer entities explain the higher layer entities. This picture is 
made precise in the following biconditional: necessarily, x grounds 
y if and only if y’s existence, or some feature of y, is metaphysically 
explicable by reference to x’s existence and features. In other words: 
 
Grounding Biconditional (GB): 
 
□∀x∀y (Gxy ↔ ∃Y ∃X (Yy ∧ Xx ∧ Xx < Yy)) 
 
Where ‘G’ is a binary relation which translates as ‘…grounds…’. 
The idea is simply that we have grounding in all and only those 
cases where we have metaphysical explanation. 
That truthmaker theory (TT) makes this picture untenable 
comes out when we consider modal truths, specifically those 
concerning the possible existence of certain entities. GB entails 
that such truths concerning y can be (metaphysically) explained by 
a feature of x only if x grounds y.20 Otherwise, we could – contra 
GB – have explanations detached from grounding. That is, GB 
entails the following conditional: 
 
♢Grounding Conditional (♢GC): 
 
□∀x∀y ∃X (Xx < ♢ ∃z y=z ) → Gxy) 
 
However – as we will see – this, in combination with truthmaker 
theory, entails the necessary necessity of existence (NNE). This is a 
                                                 
20  And presumably the truthmaker theorist will want to say the feature of x 
which explains that of y is x’s existence 
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disaster for truthmaker theory. I will explain why shortly, but let 
us first through the entailment. 
I will begin by showing that TM, TE and ♢GC entail there 
could not exist entities which do not actually exist. Here’s the 
argument; suppose – for reduction – that l is a possible world 
which contains an entity alien to the actual world, @. Call this 
entity y. y is alien relative to @ if and only if y does not exist in @. If 
l is a possible world, then it is true of @ that <Possible, y exists>. 
Call this proposition POSSIBLEy. This is a modal proposition, 
specifically one concerning possible existence. By TM, POSSIBLEy 
requires a truthmaker. By TE, this truthmaker must explain the 
possibility of y’s existence. 
However – here’s the rub – ♢GC entails that there can be no 
such thing. This is because ♢GC says there is such a thing only if it 
grounds y. But, given y does not exist in @, there is nothing in @ 
which grounds y; grounding, like every relation, relates only 
existing entities. But then, there is nothing (in @) the existence of 
which explains y’s possible existence. Hence, given TE, there can 
be no truthmaker for POSSIBLEy. So, given TM, POSSIBLEy is not 
true of @. Contradiction. 
Therefore, l is not a possible world after all. There can be 
no worlds which contain entities that are not contained in the 
actual world. 
The remainder of this argument relies on the B-schema: a 
schema guaranteeing the accessibility relation is symmetric.21 
Given this, truthmaker theory also entails that there can be no 
possible worlds which lack entities contained in the actual world. 
For suppose – for reduction – that k is such a world. Then k lacks 
some actually existing entity, z. Enter the B-schema: if k is 
accessible from the actual world, the actual world is accessible 
from k.22 Hence, if k is a possible world, it is true of k that 
<Possibly, z exists>. Call this proposition POSSIBLEz. But z is an 
alien entity relative to k , so k is in the exact same position vis-à-vis 
                                                 
21  i.e. P → □♢P. 
22  Lycan, W., (1994, pg. 50) uses a similar argument to combat combinatorialism. 
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@ as was @ vis-à-vis l. By TM, POSSIBLEz needs a truthmaker (in k). 
But by TE and ♢GC it cannot have one. For a truthmaker for 
POSSIBLEz would need to explain its truth, and given there is 
nothing in k which grounds z, by ♢GC there is nothing in k which 
explains the truth of POSSIBLEz. So POSSIBLEz doesn’t have a 
truthmaker in k. Contradiction. Therefore, k must not be a possible 
world either. There can be no world which lacks any entities 
which are contained the actual world. 
From here, it is an easy step to NNE; if there are no possible 
worlds which contain entities extra to the actual world, and no 
possible worlds which lacks entities contained in the actual world, 
necessarily every entity exists necessarily. I.e.: 
 
NNE: 
□∀y □∃x x=y 
 
As I assert above, this is a disaster for truthmaker theory. 
This is because, given TM and TN, NNE induces complete modal 
collapse; it makes truth and necessary truth equivalent. Here’s 
how: by maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker which, by 
necessitarianism, strictly implies the truth it makes true. But by 
NNE every truthmaker exists necessarily. Since every truthmaker 
exists necessarily, and strictly implies the truths it makes true, 
every truth is necessarily true. That is, P → □P. Of course, □P → P, 
so P ↔ □P; complete modal collapse.23 
Being a disaster for truthmaker theory, the truthmaker theorists 
must resist this argument at all costs. 
What is the cost? Well, assuming the B-schema, the truthmaker 
theorist needs to deny ♢GB, and therefore GB. In fact, they need 
to do somewhat more then this; they need to deny there is any 
relation characterizable by equivalency with metaphysical explanation. 
This is simply because the word ‘grounds’ was not crucial to the 
argument; if there is some relation, ‘zounds’ which is characterizable 
by equivalency to metaphysical explanation then the argument 
                                                 
23  See Williamson, T., (1999, 2013). 
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will go through just the same if we replace all instances of ‘grounds’ 
with ‘zounds’ (and ‘grounding’ with ‘zounding’). Hence: 
 
Conclusion 3: 
 
(TM ∧ TN ∧ TE) → ¬∃Z □∀x∀y (Zxy ↔ ∃Y ∃X (Yy ∧ Xx ∧ Xx < Yy)) 
 
From this the denial of GB drops out as a corollary: 
 
Corollarygb: 
 
(TM ∧ TN ∧ TE) → ¬GB 
 
And so we have a first account of the cost; the truthmaker 
theorist needs to deny that any relation, including grounding, is 
equivalent to metaphysical explanation. Let us go further. Is there 
any way to do this whilst keeping the tight connection between 
grounding and explanation? I do not think so. I will discuss such a 
way -the only plausible way I can think of- in the remainder of this 
section. I will find that it does not help truthmaker theory avoid 
the necessity of existence. 
The way I will consider could be glossed as ‘taking the 
modal context seriously’. The truthmaker theorist might be happy 
with GB in non-modal contexts, whilst insisting that GB is 
restricted in certain modal contexts. They might say that the 
possibility of x grounding y, is sufficient (and necessary) for 
explaining the possible features of y by reference to features of x. 
We don’t need actual grounding (they could say) in these modal 
contexts, only the possibility of grounding. So where we restrict 
the range of the predicate variable Y to only modal properties, we 
get the following biconditional: 
 
Grounding Biconditional* (GB*): 
 
□∀x∀y (♢Gxy ↔ ∃Y ∃X (Yy ∧ Xx ∧ Xx < Yy)) 
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Which entails: 
 
♢Grounding Conditional* (♢GC*): 
 
□∀x∀y ∃X (Xx < ♢ ∃z y=z ) → ♢Gxy) 
 
Rather then the actual grounding of y by x being necessary 
for some feature of x to explain y’s possible existence, it is the 
possibility of such grounding which is necessary. So ♢GC* 
replaces ♢GC. 
It seems like this helps. Reconsider @ and l. Although x does 
not actually ground y (because y is a mere possibillia), perhaps 
there is some possible world -let us call it j- in which x grounds y. 
Hence, it is possible for x to ground y. If this is possible, then 
◇GC* does not rule out x’s existence explaining the possibility of 
y existing, in @. As such, x is not ruled out as the actual truthmaker 
for POSSIBLEy. Hence, the previous road to NNE is blocked; it 
seems one can be a truthmaker theorist without being committed 
to the necessary necessity of existence. 
Unfortunately, the helping is illusory. The problem is that, 
necessarily, ground strictly implies grounded. 24 This is called the 
strict entailment principle: necessarily, if x grounds y, then x’s 
existence strictly implies y’s existence. I.e.: 
 
Strict Entailment Principle (SEP): 
 
□ (Gxy → □ (∃z x=z → ∃z1 y=z1)) 
 
In the light of this, consider j; the possible world in which x 
grounds y. This possible world is needed for POSSIBLEy to be true 
of the actual world, @. Because j is a possible world, it is accessible 
from @. Hence, ground strictly implies grounded in j (by SEP). 
But, given the B-schema, if j is accessible from @, then @ is 
accessible from j. So ground implies grounded in the actual world. 
                                                 
24  As argued for by Rosen, G., (2010), Trogdon, K., (2013). 
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By hypothesis, x exists in @; this is why it was (purportedly) able 
to make POSSIBLEy true (for non-existent entities don’t make 
anything true). But then, given ground actually implies grounded 
that means y must exist in @ as well. And so y must actually exist 
after all: y’s possible existence turns out to require its actual 
existence. We are now on the royal road to NNE. Nothing which 
doesn’t actually exist could possibly exist and, by parity of 
reasoning nothing which actually exists could fail to exist (given 
the B-schema). That is to say, necessarily everything exists necessarily; 
precisely the claim that GB* and ♢GC* were meant to extricate the 
truthmaker theorist from. So appealing to merely possible 
grounding relations turns out to be no help at all. 
In a second accounting, then, this cost of truthmaker theory is 
the denial of any equivalency between grounding and metaphysical 
explanation. We might well wonder what this cost amounts to. 
That depends on how central one thinks some such equivalency is 
to the concept of ‘grounds’. I would tentatively suggest it is very 
central indeed; that it has an irreplaceable role in characterizing 
the reference of grounding in the same way as ‘horselike creature 
with just one horn’ has an irreplaceable role in characterizing 
‘unicorn’. If this suggestion is correct, then this cost amounts to a 
denial of the existence of a grounding relation in the same way 
denying the existence of any horselike creatures with just one horn 
amounts to denying the existence of unicorns. In other words: 
 
Conclusion 4: 
 
(TM ∧ TN ∧ TE) → ¬∃X X=G 
 
Hence if one thinks that there can be -or are- grounding 
relations, one better restrict the truthmaker requirement in the face 
of certain modal propositions. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
I have argued for four conclusions. Firstly, truthmaker theory 
implies that it is not possible for there to be nothing. Secondly, 
truthmaker theory implies that if an entity is possibly accompanied, 
it is necessarily accompanied. Thirdly, truthmaker theory makes 
an equivalency between grounding and metaphysical explanation 
untenable which, fourthly, entails that grounding relations could 
not exist. I think none of these conclusions are palatable. To avoid 
them, we should restrict the truthmaker requirement. 
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